In teaching jurisprudence, I typically distinguish between two different families of theories of adjudication, theories of how judges do or should decide cases.
straw-man view of adjudication as their target. I have no brief here on behalf of their accounts, and if Tamanaha's book has the salutary effect of improving the quality of their work, that will be to his lasting credit. (I do agree with Fred Schauer, though, who points out to me that the political science work on courts is a useful corrective to much doctrinal scholarship in constitutional law, which talks as though the doctrine is really explanatory of Supreme Court decisions.) that Tamanaha has articulated a prima facie challenge to the standard historical narrative about a certain kind of formalism, identifying, in particular, several instances where Frank and Gilmore grossly mischaracterized earlier writers.
But Tamanaha also purports to have a substantive jurisprudential thesis-suggested by the volume's title and the explicit ambition of the final two chapters-namely, that he is moving us "beyond" the distinction between formalism and realism about judging: "legal theory discussions of legal formalism are irrelevant, misleading, or empty. Debates about judging are routinely framed in terms of antithetical formalist-realist poles that jurists do not actually hold" (3).
12 Unfortunately, the thesis that jurists do (or do not) "hold" formalist or realist views turn on sloppy characterizations of these views by Tamanaha (sometimes simply echoing sloppy characterizations by others). And even if jurists did not hold the views when precisely characterized, that would do nothing to show there was not an important jurisprudential distinction between formalist and realist conceptions of adjudication:
the question is whether these conceptions count as plausible reconstructions of judicial practice
(regardless of what judges say), ones that illuminate important conceptual and normative issues about adjudication. The argument of Tamanaha's book is, in the end, irrelevant to philosophy of law. Perhaps more seriously from the standpoint of Tamanaha's primary ambition-namely, to revise the standard historical narrative about American legal thought-some of the sloppiness in stating the competing positions, formalism and realism, creates problems for the historical evidence Tamanaha adduces and raises questions about the reliability of his presentation of it.
12 This non-sequitur is not simply an artifact of the introduction to the book. Tamanaha repeats it again much later: "Any approach that defines 'formalism' in these terms has doubtful validity, as earlier chapters demonstrated. These ideas were not widely held in the U.S. legal tradition, if they were held by any jurists at all" (p. 160).
Formalism and Realism: The Historical Narrative
Let us begin with the historical thesis, which is a coin with two sides, one about formalism and one about realism. Regarding legal formalism, Tamanaha's target is legal historians and theorists like Gilmore, Horwitz, and Kennedy 13 who claim that the 1870s to the 1920s in the United States were "the heyday of legal formalism" according to which "lawyers and judges saw law as autonomous comprehensive, logically ordered, and determinate and believed that judges engaged in pure mechanical deduction from this body of law to produce single correct outcomes" (p. 1). On this account, legal formalism was brought to an end by the Realists, who "building upon the insights of Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Roscoe Pound, and Benjamin Cardozo" showed "that the law is filled with gaps and contradictions, that the law is indeterminate, that there are exceptions for almost every legal rule or principle, and that legal principles and precedents can support different results" (p. 1). Judges, according to these realists, "decide according to their personal preferences" and come up with post-hoc legal rationales for the decisions so reached.
14 Tamanaha distinguishes between two aspects of the "formalism" assigned by legal historians to thinkers of the 19 th -century (see Ch. 2). First, there was a "formalist" "theory of the nature of law (the common law, in particular)" according to which "in new situations judges did not make law (even when declaring new rules) but merely discovered and applied preexisting law" (p. 13). Second, there was a "formalist" theory about judicial decision, about "how judge mechanically apply law (precedents and statutes) to the facts in particular cases" (p. 13). Tamanaha claims the connection between the two 13 See esp. pp. 60-61.
14 It's not clear the Realists held the views so described, as I discussed many years ago in "Rethinking Legal
Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence," 76 Texas Law Review 267 (1997), reprinted as Chapter 1 in my Naturalizing Jurisprudence. But we can bracket that issue for the moment.
stories "is tight" (p. 13), 15 though I do not see that he makes the case, and as a conceptual matter, the two theses are obviously distinct. The first "formalist" view-call it "Natural Law Formalism"--is an instance of a standard "natural law" canard according to which there is always a pre-existing answer to every legal question, usually one that requires moral reflection (or, in earlier forms, insight into the divine will) to discover. Harvard Law Review 457 (1897) about the three possible explanations for why a judge might make a particular legal argument (e.g., implying a condition in a contract in a particular case): "It is because of some belief as to the practice of the community or a class, or because of some opinion as to policy, or, in short, because of some attitude of yours upon a matter not capable of exact quantitative measurement, and therefore not capable of founding exact logical conclusions." Id. at 466. The Realists of the 1920s and 1930s focused almost wholly on the first and third possibilities, not the second.
It should be noted that the CLS version of "law is politics" is generally not the same as the political science version, which Tamanaha mostly emphasizes. For the CLS writers, law was often "political" in the sense that the indeterminacies in the law were filled in based on underlying but inchoate philosophical views of a moral and political kind. The locus classicus for that kind of CLS view is Duncan Kennedy, "Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication," 89 Harvard Law Review 1685 (1976 . But this theme was also not one of interest to the Realists.
otherwise. If one looks at classic Realist studies like Llewellyn on sales law 25 or Moore on check-cashing practices, 26 there was no interest, at all, in the political party of the judge, the judge's political ideology, or the political objectives of the appointing President. Rather, in each case, the Realists tried to show that non-legal norms of fairness or efficiency, often deriving from normal practice in the relevant business context, explained the decisions. Rather than judges imposing an "economic and social philosophy" (as Teddy Roosevelt put it, in the quote above), the emphasis in most Realist writings was on the sensitivity of judges to non-legal norms prevalent, e.g., in the regular practices of merchants or banks.
Even when Tamanaha tries to produce evidence that more precise and distinctive Realist theses about adjudication were common well before the Realists came on the scene, he mostly produces either inapposite evidence or, more seriously, mischaracterizes his sources. Noting, for example, that Realists believed that to predict judicial decisions, one needed to attend to "the reactions of the judges to the facts and to the life around them" (quoting Llewellyn at p. 80), Tamanaha claims "this too was said much earlier" and then cites Frederick Pollock noting that "legal science" aims to predict "the decisions of Tamanaha also quotes Judge Thomas Cooley observing in 1886 that "when a case is such that just and well-instructed minds differ as to its coming within the intent of the statute, the rule laid down by the *presiding judge+ or the prevailing majority of its members becomes a rule of law" (p. 81). But this banal observation-that if there is a dispute about the intent or purpose of the statute, the court's decision will settle the matter and create a binding precedent-has nothing to do with the distinctive Realist theses about statutory interpretation, 27 which suggest that across a wide range of statutory interpretation cases, the judge has available equally proper, but utterly conflicting, principles of statutory interpretation so that the actual "rule" of the statute is "up for grabs."
On the key issue of the influence of situation-types on judicial decision (which Tamanaha What does this have to do with the distinctive Realist thesis according to which appellate judges are largely applying non-legal norms to recurring situation-types, while reciting general legal doctrines that are mere window-dressing and which obscure the normative considerations influencing their decisions?
Literally nothing, as far as I can see, which is quite apparent when one attends to the context of Carter's argument.
Carter wants to defend the common-law tradition of judges making new law for new situations against proponents of complete codification of the law, such as Jeremy Bentham, the target of the preceding pages in Carter's article. Against the proponents of codification, Carter argues that codification is impracticable, but also that it is undesireable because it will entail arbitrary and unjust decisions in "new" or "future" transactions:
Our power to subject objects to a scientific classification being necessarily limited to those which are submitted to observation, the jurist, or the codifier, can no more classify future human transactions, and, consequently can no more frame the law concerning them, than the naturalist can classify the fauna and flora of an unknown world.
29
To be sure "unwritten" common law, takes the transactions of the past, and, by classifying them, makes its rules; but it makes them provisionally only. It declares that they are binding upon courts only so far as respects 28 James C. Carter, "The Provinces of the Written and the Unwritten Law," 24 American Law Review 1, 15
(1890).
29 Id. at 10.
transactions substantially like those from the examination of which the rules have been framed.
In respect to future cases which may wear different aspects, it suspends judgment.
30
So the "future cases" at issue for Carter are those which are sufficiently different from the past cases, on the basis of which common-law doctrines were crafted, that the unwritten rules of the common law should not be binding. Codification, for a radical reformer like Bentham, was meant to do away with the "unwritten" judge-made rules, but at the cost, says Carter, of laying down rules for unknown situations. What leads to the passage Tamanaha quotes is Carter's consideration of the rejoinder of the "Benthamite" that, even if codification might produce unjust and arbitrary results for genuinely new cases, such cases are "so small in number" that the "miscarriages" of justice resulting would be trivial.
31
The quoted passage is then Carter's response, and thus part of his continued defense of the need for "unwritten" rules crafted by judges in response to new circumstances. We can now see that what
Carter really says in this passage has nothing at all to do with the Realist theory of appellate decision based on responsiveness to situation-types. Rather, Carter makes the sensible point that where the problems are familiar ones, settled common-law doctrines are so clear that the matters do not end up in court at all, which means it is precisely the new or "future" cases-ones for which no legal rule governs--that will command the attention most often of judges. The genuine Realist, by contrast, would be skeptical that even the settled common-law doctrines, at least at the level of abstraction at which they are typically articulated, will really explain the decisions of the courts in later cases. On this distinctive
Realist thesis, Carter is completely silent. 
Formalism and Realism: The Jurisprudential Issues
Tamanaha says he wants to rebut a "common misapprehension about the realists… [namely] that they were radical skeptics about judging" (p. 68). 35 Rather, the Realists embraced what Tamanaha calls "balanced realism" (p. 6), an awareness that, 35 He also denies that "the legal realists formed a group or movement" (p. 68). His evidence is that "the main characterizations of legal realism put forth by theorists and historians"-he cites only Laura Kalman, Robert Summers, John Henry Schlegel and Morton Horwitz-are "the promotion of an instrumental view of law as a means to serve social ends, the pursuit of social scientific approaches to law, the efforts of reformers to transform legal education in order to improve legal practice and judging, and attempts ty reformers to advance a progressive judges sometimes make choices, that they can manipulate legal rules and precedents, and that Since Frederick Schauer and I developed more refined versions of these same points about American
Legal Realism in widely cited scholarship going back twenty years now, 37 it is puzzling, indeed, to see
Tamanaha announce this as though it were a discovery. Of course, the bulk of our work was devoted to rendering precise issues such as (1) the actual influences on judicial decision, (2) how often judge "make choices," (3) when legal rules really constrain decisions and when they don't, and (4) the difference between legal factors constraining decisions (and rendering it predictable) versus non-legal factors that political agenda in and through the law-or some amalgamation of all four" (p. 70). He then fairly notes that those often listed as Realists "did not agree among themselves on these positions." Id. Since he, inexplicably, omits attempts by jurisprudential writers to explicitly state distinctive jurisprudential theses characteristic of Realismnamely, mine and Fred Schauer's (though he otherwise cites our work)-this is hardly surprising. But we will return to this issue, below, in the text.
have the same effects (Tamanaha runs them together under the heading of "rule-bound aspect"). 38 In this respect, Tamanaha's treatment of Realism in Chapter 6 marks a somewhat unhappy step backwards in the jurisprudential discussion of Realism.
39
To make matters worse, though, Tamanaha also argues that Schauer and I have gotten the
Realists wrong on the basis of either mischaracterizations of our views or misuse of evidence. For example, Tamanaha quotes (pp. 93-94) Schauer as follows:
The Realists believed that decision-makers, especially judges deciding hard cases, initially make an 'all things considered' judgment about who ought to win. That preliminary judgment, taking into account moral, political, economic, and psychological factors, is not arbitrary, but is particularistic in focusing on the optimal results for this case…To the Legal Realist, rules serve The realists believed in the law and fervently labored to improve it. Llewellyn unabashedly proclaimed his "faith about the Good in this institution of our law"; and he waxed poetically on 38 In my own case, an important part of the aim was to show that the Realist theory can be reconstructed in a way that reflects recognizable philosophical motivations, of a naturalistic kind, and insulates it from wellknown criticisms in the philosophical literature. But these points are not at issue here. 39 A contrast is usefully drawn here with the work by Michael Steven Green on Realism. See, e.g., his
"Legal Realism as Theory of Law," 46 William & Mary Law Review 1915 (2005 . While I think Green wrong, partly on textual and partly on philosophical grounds, Green's work is jurisprudentially interesting because it articulates precise and distinctive Realist theses about law and adjudication.
"the aesthetics of certain legal arts I deeply love." In defense of the realists, Eugene Rostow, the dean of Yale Law School who knew many of the key players, remarked that "the legal realists were among our most devoted and effective reformers, both of law and of society." Jerome Frank confessed, "I am-I make no secret of it-a reformer."
The various goals of the realists were to increase the certainty and predictability of law, to train better lawyers, to advance legal justice, and to reform the law to better serve social needs. (p. 94)
It is unclear, however, how these points are relevant to the adequacy of Schauer's gloss on the Realist position, unless one assumes that his use of "especially" means that Schauer is claiming that Realists believe judges always decide in the way described, as opposed to so deciding in that small number of "selected"-for cases that reach the stage of appellate review, which has always been Schauer's expressed view. 41 That judges in those kinds of cases make result-oriented decisions based either on particularistic grounds or by reference to non-legal norms prevalent in the context where the dispute arose, and then cite legal doctrines as a post-hoc rationalization for the decision, is compatible with, inter alia, loving the law, thinking the law delimits the range of permissible outcomes, thinking most legal cases (e.g., those that do not reach the stage of appellate review) are determinate as a matter of law, thinking that decisions can be made more predictable by attending to the situation-types to which the judges were actually responsive, restating the law to capture the pertinent level of fact-specificty to which judges were sensitive, and so on. appellate decisions. Tamanaha also purports at one point to be disputing my claim that "American Legal Realism was, quite justifiably, the major intellectual event in 20 th century American legal practice and scholarship" (Naturalizing Jurisprudence, p. 1), but since he does not, as we have seen, actually discuss the distinctive views of the Realists, on which my claim was predicated, there is no dispute. Everyone can agree with Tamanaha that before Realism, there were at least some jurists and scholars who recognized the influence of politics on judicial decision and were skeptical that mechanical deduction did any justice to the nature of legal reasoning, but this would do nothing to show that "Realism about judging was commonplace decades before the legal realists came on the scene" (p. 68). An more egregious case-because I had pointed out the error to Tamanaha in an earlier version of this material-is the purported criticism (on p. 2 of his book) of my account of formalism in "Positivism, Formalism, Realism," 99 Columbia Law Review 1138 (1999 , without noting that I was articulating competing substantive views of adjudication, not making an historical claim of the kind he is criticizing. Even if most late 19th-century writers were "realists" instead of "formalists," this would have no bearing on the jurisprudential question about how we ought to understand adjudication.
are, in fact, "plainly evident aspects of judging" (p. 91). Is it really evident that in appellate cases, judges are primarily responding to factual situation-types and then finding post-hoc legal rationales for what they think would be 'fair' or 'sensible' given the situation-type? (The critics of my interpretation of
Realism certainly have not thought so!
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) But as we have already seen, by "realism" Tamanaha often does not mean the views distinctive of the Realists. What is "plainly evident," he says, is that "the law has inconsistencies, runs out, and routinely comes up against unanticipated situations and that judges possess a substantial degree of flexibility when working with legal materials. It was obvious to observers that the law can be interpreted differently by judge with different views" (p. 91 (again, it is hard to say for sure, because the characterization is vague and shifting) thought he had a dispute with the Realists, and rightly so. 45 In Chapter 10 (esp. pp. 186-196), Tamanaha expands on his earlier description of "balanced realism,"
attributing to realism about adjudication nine claims (his rambling discussion is somewhat repetitive, so I have trimmed the list a bit here): (1) "When judges perceive facts, interpret the law, and render judgments, they are influenced by cognitive framing in the same ways that all cognition is influenced" (p. 187), but the inevitability of cognitive framing is not the same as "willful judging," which, unlike the former, "is not uibiquitous and is not inevitable" (p. 188); (2) "when judges render legal decisions, except in the most routine cases, the purposes behind the applicable rules and the consequences of the decision will have a bearing" (p. 189); (3) "uncertainties will inevitably arise in interpretation and application of legal rules and principles" (p. 190); (4) "the region of legal uncertainty is where judges render decisions with the least legal guidance, and where judges' mix of legal and social views has the most leeway and impact-though still in a context thick with legal norms" (p. 190); (5) "judges are sometimes confronted with what they consider 'bad rules' or 'bad results,'" though they "do not take a uniform position or follow the same course in such situations" (p. 191) though sometimes in cases of this kind there "is an enhanced potential for the influence of the personal values of" the judge to affect the decision (p. 192); (6) "the common law and statutes contain a variety of standards like fairness and reasonableness, or provisions that require balancing, or that requires judges…to make judgments. The judgments called for cannot be made in a rule-like fashion and are not determined by legal factors alone," though judges may often agree due to their sharing "similar training in the legal tradition and its values" as well as "social views" (p. 192); (7) "judges are not machines or computers" (p. 194); (8) "judicial decisions frequently are consistent with and determined by the law" (p. 194); (9) "law is continuously being worked out by judges" (p. 195). Some of these claims are, at this level of generality, quite banal or merely the flip-side of the denial of Vulgar Formalism (e.g., 3, 7 & 9); some are of dubious Realist pedigree (e.g., 1, 2 & 6); and some are contested by other accounts of adjudication, as discussed in the text. Appellate judges sometimes make law. Both participants in and observers of the judicial process have recognized this fact for many years [citing Frank, Dewey, and Roger Traynor] . One might expect that today, more than a half-century after the Legal Realist movement, the phenomenon of the exercise of "judicial discretion" would have been so exhaustively studied as to merit no more than a passing reference in preparation for the examination of more controversial matters. That turns out not to be true. Not only does the activity of judicial lawmaking remain mysterious, but a at her confirmation hearings about the role of the judge to apply the law, not "make" law, leading completely disgusted by Judge Sotomayor's testimony today. If she was not perjuring herself, she is intellectually unqualified to be on the Supreme Court. If she was perjuring herself, she is morally unqualified. How could someone who has been on the bench for seventeen years possibly believe that judging in hard cases involves no more than applying the law to the facts? First year law students understand within a month that many areas of the law are open textured and indeterminate-that the legal material frequently (actually, I would say always) must be supplemented by contestable presuppositions, empirical assumptions, and moral judgments. To claim otherwiseto claim that fidelity to uncontested legal principles dictates results-is to claim that whenever Justices disagree among themselves, someone is either a fool or acting in bad faith. What does it say about our legal system that in order to get confirmed Judge Sotomayor must tell the lies that she told today? That judges and justices must live these lies throughout their professional careers? Perhaps Justice Sotomayor should be excused because our official ideology about judging is so degraded that she would sacrifice a position on the Supreme Court if she told the truth. Legal academics who defend what she did today have no such excuse. They should be ashamed of themselves 50 Consider Elena Kagan's repeated claim, reported in multiple news outlets, that it is "law all the way down" in appellate adjudication.
51 " Rule and Reason," Times Literary Supplement 24 (Feb. 26, 2010) constrain and explain the decisions of the courts. Birks was not Vulgar Formalist, nor was he a Natural Law Formalist, but he was certainly a Sophisticated Formalist, who thought the duty of the scholar was to take seriously the way courts reason with legal concepts, and then help them do it even more successfully. In the land where the law is still standardly taught from black-letter treatises written by the leading scholars, it should hardly be surprising that Balanced Realism is manifestly not the received wisdom of scholars and jurists.
Perhaps, though, we should interpret Tamanaha Put to one side the fact that Hart's method of ordinary-language philosophy was not meant to track lexicographic results, Tamanaha's omission is telling: the fact that even an Internet dictionary uses as its core example "motor vehicle" does jibe nicely with Hart's intuition that automobiles are indeed core instances of "vehicles" (without any regard for the 'purpose' of the rule) while bicycles and roller skates are not. Remember, too, that Hart was not claiming that it was a clear mistake of language to deem a bicycle a "vehicle," but rather that competent speakers of English will have different intuitions about that usage (with some adopting it, some eschewing it), such that it is indeterminate whether or not a rule covering "vehicles" covers bicycles. By contrast, competent speakers will all agree that an automobile is a "vehicle," as the very dictionary Tamanaha cites, but selectively quotes, demonstrates.
To be sure, there can be contexts of interpretation where the pragmatics, as distinct, from the semantics of meaning come to the fore, and "meaning and considerations of purposes are intertwined" (p. 170), as Tamanaha puts it, but his discussion does not show that the distinction between meaning and purposive interpretation is not a real one.
Tamanaha is aware, of course, that there are self-described formalists in America today. Yet in discussing contemporary self-identified formalists, like Justice Scalia and Harvard law professor John Manning, the best Tamanaha can do is to note that they are not, in my terms, Vulgar Formalists (i.e., they don't think judicial decision is just mechanical deduction) (p. 178). Ironically, Tamanaha himself gives a perfectly apt characterization of their Sophisticated Formalism (footnotes omitted):
[T]hey want clear contractual terms to be enforced as written rather than be modified by courts; they prefer the constraint and predictability of legal rules over the openness of legal standards; they emphasize the text of legislation; they objective to giving weight to legislative history in the interpretation of statutes; they would not permit purpose to trump the plain meaning of statutory terms; they advoced adherence to precedent; they argue that courts ought to defer to : there may well be indeterminacies and gaps in the law now, but the ambition of the formalist is to eliminate them, to produce a system of law and legal reasoning that is determinate throughout.
Tamanaha admits that these views mark a distinction between "contemporary jurists" who self-idenitify as "formalists and their opponents" (p. 179), and it certainly does: many theorists, Hart perhaps most famously, rejected formalism as a normative ideal. 58 Given this concession, one wonders why Tamanaha thinks his argument moves one "beyond the formalist-realist divide"? Perhaps the correct title of Tamanaha's book should have been: refining the formalist-realist dispute about adjudication. I suppose such an ambition, though intellectually legitimate, would have been less exciting, and would overlap too obviously with well-traversed terrain.
Let me conclude by recapping the main lines of argument regarding Tamanaha's jurisprudential thesis that we can (or should) move "beyond" formalism and realism. Tamanaha attributes to the Realists a view he calls "balanced realism," a somewhat looser version of the account of Realism developed by Schauer and myself in the 1990s, though Tamanaha's version tends to over-emphasize the role of politics in judicial decision-making. He claims, falsely, that everyone is a "balanced Realist" 57 I owe this way of putting the point to Scott Shapiro. 58 The Concept of Law, largely on the basis of remarks by post-Realist judges, and, at the same time, accords little or no attention to the evidence that "balanced realism" is not accepted, such as public political debate about adjudication in the U.S. (which is quite formalistic in its assumptions), theoretical accounts of adjudication like Ronald Dworkin's, and the self-understanding of other common-law legal cultures, like
England's. Tamanaha also argues, unsuccessfully, that "formalism" is "empty," but, in the process, actually reveals its substantive meaning as a normative theory or ideal of adjudication and ruleapplication.
Conclusion
Tamanaha's book reflects some striking research into the views of (largely forgotten or neglected) 19 th -century law professors and jurists, and the material he has brought to our attention will demand attention from legal historians. One often has the sense, though, that having unearthed this material, Tamanaha was determined (no matter what!) to show that it really matters, that it really must change our views about realism and formalism, and about the originality of the Realists. Tamanaha's lack of conceptual clarity about the different kinds of formalist and realist theses about adjudication, together with his penchant to sometimes poach quotes out of context, warrants some skepticism about this ambition of the book. At the same time, one must acknowledge that many of Tamanaha's targets are as conceptually confused as he is, and that by disabusing those readers of the idea that most jurists thought legal decision-making was mechanical (Vulgar Formalism) or that common-law judges never make law (Natural Law Formalism), the book will have a salutary effect. Notwithstanding the preceding criticisms, then, I think we should be grateful to Tamanaha for his provocative historical research, for laying down a vigorous challenge that should be met by historians of ideas and social scientists, and for imparting appropriate intellectual caution and modesty to future writers who might otherwise be prone to casual talk about a "formalist" age in American legal thought.
